Consider a group of individuals with heterogenous prior beliefs or perspectives about a sequence of states. Individuals receive informative signals about each state, on the basis of which they form posterior beliefs or opinions. In each period, each individual can choose to observe the opinion of one other, but perspectives and signals are unobservable. The heterogeneity and unobservability of perspectives introduces a trade-off between targets who are well-informed (in the sense that their signals are precise) and those who are well-understood (in the sense that the observer's beliefs about the target's perspective is precise). Observing an opinion provides information about both the current period state and about the target's perspective. Hence observed individuals become better-understood over time, although the degree to which this occurs depends on the extent to which both observer and observed are well-informed at the time of observation. This allows for both history dependence and symmetry breaking in the formation of links. We identify conditions under which history independence prevails in the long run. When this condition fails to hold, a number of network structures can arise, including opinion leadership, information segregation, and static networks.
Introduction
Among the many important roles played by networks in social and economic life is that of carriers of information. In fact, the formation of links among otherwise disconnected individuals is often motivated precisely by this function. Subscriptions to blog and twitter feeds have this character, as do more traditional activities such as the monitoring of radio and television broadcasts or the reading of books and newspapers.
Since an individual's capacity to receive and process information is limited, it is necessary to make choices regarding the set of opinions that one chooses to observe at any time. These choices are complicated by the fact that the observation of another's opinion gives rise to an inference problem, since an opinion is based partly on one's information and partly on one's prior beliefs. If the prior beliefs of all individuals were mutually known, this problem would have a trivial solution, and each individual would simply choose to observe those who happen to have the most precise information.
But prior beliefs are not generally observable, and this gives rise to a trade-off between individuals who are well-informed and those who are well-understood. An individual is well-informed if the precision of her information is high. She is well-understood by an observer if the precision of the observer's beliefs about her prior is high. That is, a person is well-understood if her beliefs reveal her information with a high degree of precision. Clearly, there is little value in observing a well-informed person who is very poorly understood in this sense, since her beliefs will provide a very noisy signals about her information to the observer. Hence individuals will not always observe those who are the best-informed, especially if informational differences across individuals are small relative to differences in the degree to which they are well-understood.
This has some interesting dynamic implications, since the observation of an opinion not only provides a signal about the information that gave rise to it, but also reveals something about the observed individual's prior belief. In other words, the process of being observed makes one better understood. This process can give rise to unusual and interesting patterns of linkages over time, even of all individuals are identical to begin with. It is these effects with which the present paper is concerned, with particular focus on three phenomena: opinion leadership, information segregation, and static networks.
The model we explore has the following structure. There is a finite set of individuals and sequence of periods. Corresponding to each period is an unobserved state. Individuals all believe that the states are independently and identically distributed, but differ with respect to their prior beliefs about the distribution from which these states are drawn. These beliefs, which we call perspectives, are themselves unobservable, although each individual holds beliefs about the perspectives of others. In each period, each individual receives a signal that is informative about the current state; the precision of this signal is the individual's expertise in that period. Levels of expertise are independently and identically distributed across individuals and periods, and their realized values are public information. Individuals update their beliefs on the basis of their signals, resulting in posterior beliefs we call opinions. They then choose a target individual whose opinion may also be observed, and make this choice by selecting the target whose opinion is most informative to them.
The observation of an opinion has two effects. First, it affects the observer's belief about the current period state and allows her to take a more informed action. Second, the observer's belief about the target's perspective itself becomes more precise. Hence there will be a tendency to link to previously observed targets even when they are not the best-informed in the current period. But, importantly, the level of attachment to a previously observed target depends on the expertise realizations of both observer and observed in the period in which the observation occurred.
Specifically, better informed observers learn more about the perspectives of their targets since they have more precise beliefs about the signal that the target is likely to have received. But holding constant one's own expertise, one learns more about the perspective of a poorly informed target, since the opinion of such a target will be heavily weighted to their prior rather than their signal.
This effect implies symmetry breaking over time: two observers who select the same target initially will develop different levels of attachment to that target. Hence they might make make different choices in subsequent periods, despite the fact that all expertise realizations are public information and a given individual's expertise is common to all observers. Several interesting linkage patterns can arise over time as a result of this effect. Opinion leadership, where a small subset of individuals is observed with high frequency, is clearly one possible outcome. But information segregation, where the set of individuals is partitioned into groups with no observation across groups is also possible. Moreover, any static network of links can be a limit of the process of link formation.
We identify conditions on the key parameters of the model-the degree of initial uncertainty about the perspectives of others, and the distribution from which expertise is drawn-under which each of these patterns can arise.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we specify the information structure, including the distributions from which signals and priors are drawn. Section 3 examines the evolution of beliefs and networks as individuals make observational choices. The set of networks that can arise in the long run are characterized in Section 4, and the conditions for long run history independence are stated in Section 5. Some special structures that arise when history independence fails are described in Section 6, including opinion leadership, segregation, and static networks. Section 7 identifies a sufficient condition for hysteresis. Section 8 discusses the connection between our work and other theoretical research on heterogeneous priors, observational learning, and network formation. It also discusses evidence for the stable variability in individual perspectives that motivates our analysis. Section 9 concludes.
The Model
Consider a population N = {1, . . . , n}, and a sequence of periods. In each period t, there is a state θ t ∈ R that individuals cannot observe but about which they form and update beliefs. Each individual i holds an idiosyncratic prior belief about the distribution from which these states are drawn, given by
That is, according to player i, the sequence of states θ 0 , θ 1 , . . . are independently, identically, and Normally distributed with mean µ i and variance 1. We shall refer to prior mean µ i as the perspective of individual i. An individual's perspective is not directly observable by any other individual, but it is commonly known that the n perspectives are independently and identically distributed according
for some real numbers µ 1 , ..., µ n and v 0 > 0. This describes the beliefs held by individuals about each others' perspectives prior to the receipt of any relevant information. Note that the precision in beliefs about perspectives are symmetric in the initial period, since v 0 is common to all. This symmetry is broken as individuals learn about perspectives over time, and the revision of these beliefs plays a key role in the analysis to follow.
In each period t, each individual i privately observes an informative signal
where ε it ∼ N (0, 1/π it ). The signal precisions π it capture the degree to which any given individual i is well-informed about the state in period t. We shall refer to π it as the expertise of individual i regarding the period t state, and assume that these levels of expertise are public information.
Levels of expertise π it are independently and identically distributed across individuals and periods, in accordance with an absolutely continuous distribution function F having support [a, b], where 0 < a < b < ∞. That is, no individual is ever perfectly informed of the state, but all signals carry at least some information. 1 Remark 1. Since priors are heterogenous, each individual has his own subjective beliefs. We use the subscript i to denote the individual whose belief is being considered. For example, we write θ t ∼ i N (µ i , 1) to indicate that θ t is normally distributed with mean µ i according to i. When all individuals share a belief, we drop the subscript. For example, ε it ∼ N (0, 1/π it ) means that all individuals agree that the noise in x it is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1/π it .
While an individual j does not infer anything about θ t from the value µ i , j does update her belief about θ t upon receiving information about x it . For a more extensive discussion of belief revision 1 Since πit is observable, myopic individuals need not consider the distribution from which πit is drawn. Nevertheless, this distribution affects the pattern of linkages that emerges in the long run.
with incomplete information and unobservable, heterogenous priors, see Sethi and Yildiz (2012) , where we study repeated communication about a single state among a group of individuals with equal levels of expertise.
Having observed the signal x it in period t, individual i updates her belief about the state in conformity with Bayes' rule. 2 This results in the following posterior belief for i:
where
is the expected value of θ t according to i. We refer to y it as individual i's opinion at time t.
A key concern in this paper is the process by which individuals choose targets whose opinions are then observed. We model this choice as follows. In each period t, each individual i chooses one other individual, denoted j it ∈ N , and observes her opinion y j it t about the current state θ t . This information is useful because i then chooses an actionθ it ∈ R in order to minimize
This implies that individuals always prefer to observe a more informative signal to a less informative one. We specify the actions and the payoffs only for the sake of concreteness; our analysis is valid so long as this desire to seek out the most informative signal is assumed. (In many applications this desire may be present even if no action is to be taken.) The timeline of events at each period t is as follows:
1. The levels (π 1t , . . . , π nt ) of expertise are realized and publicly observed.
2. Each i chooses some advisor j it ∈ N \ {i}.
3. Each i observes his own noisy signal x it and forms his opinion y it .
4. Each i observes the opinion y j it t of his advisor.
Each i takes an actionθ it .
It is convenient to introduce the variable l t ij which takes the value 1 if j it = j and zero otherwise. That is, l t ij indicates whether or not i links to j in period t and the n × n matrix L t := [l t ij ] defines 2 Specifically, given a prior θ ∼ N (µ, 1/v) and signal s = θ + ε with ε ∼ N (0, 1/r), the posterior is θ ∼ N (y, 1/w) where
a directed graph or network that describes who listens to whom. Note that information flows in the reverse direction of the graph. We are interested in the properties of the sequence of networks generated by this process of link formation.
We assume that individuals are myopic, do not observe the actions of others, and do not observe the realization of the state (observability of the past advisors of others will turn out to be irrelevant).
Hence the payoff is the expectation (3) itself. While these are clearly restrictive assumptions, the desire to make a good decisions even when the state realization is unobserved is quite common. For instance, one might wish to vote for the least corrupt political candidate, or donate to the charity with the greatest social impact, or support legislation regarding climate change that results in the greatest benefits per unit cost. We actively seek information in order to meet these goals, and act upon our expectations, but never know for certain whether our beliefs were accurate ex-post.
Remark 2. Even though the states, signals and expertise levels are all distributed independently across individuals and time, the inference problems at any two dates t and t are related. This is because each individual's ex-ante expectation of θ t and θ t are the same; this expectation is what we call the individual's perspective. As we show below, any information about the perspective µ j of an individual j is useful in interpreting j's opinion y jt , and this opinion in turn is informative about j's perspective. Consequently the choice of advisor at date t affects the choice of the advisor at any later date t . In particular, the initial symmetry is broken after individuals choose their first advisor, leading to potentially highly asymmetric outcomes.
Evolution of Beliefs and Networks
We now describe the criterion on the basis of which a given individual i selects a target j whose opinion y jt is to be observed, and what i learns about the state θ t and j's perspective µ j as a result of this observation. This determines the process for the evolution of beliefs and the network of information flows.
Given the hypothesis that the n perspectives are each independently drawn from a normal distribution, posterior beliefs held by one individual about the perspectives of any another will continue to be normally distributed throughout the process of belief revision. Write v t ij for the precision of the distribution of µ j according to i at beginning of t. Initially, these precisions are identical: for all i = j,
The precisions v t ij in subsequent periods depend on the history of realized expertise (π 1 , . . . , π t−1 ) and information networks (L 1 , . . . , L t−1 ). These precisions v t ij of beliefs about the perspectives of others are central to our analyses; the expected value of an individual's perspective is irrelevant as far as the target choice decision is concerned. What matters is how well a potential target is understood, not how far their perspective deviates from that of the observer.
Interpretation of Opinions and Selection of Advisors
Suppose that an individual i has chosen to observe the opinion y jt of individual j, where
by (2) . Since x jt = θ t + ε jt , this observation provides the following noisy signal regarding θ t :
The signal is noisy in two respects. First, the information x jt of j is itself noisy, with signal variance ε jt . Furthermore, since the opinion y jt depends on j's unobservable perspective µ j , the signal observed by i has an additional source of noise, reflected in the term µ j /π jt .
Taken together, the variance of the signal observed by i is
Here, the first component 1/π jt comes directly from the noise in the information of j, and is simply the variance of ε jt . It decreases as j becomes better informed. The second component, 1/(π 2 jt v t ij ), comes from the uncertainty i faces regarding the perspective µ j of j, and corresponds to the variance of µ j /π jt (where π jt is public information and hence has zero variance). This component decreases as i becomes better acquainted with the perspective µ j , that is, as j becomes better understood by i.
The cost γ reveals that in choosing an advisor j, an individual i has to trade-off the noise 1/π jt in the information of j against the noise 1/(π 2 jt v t ij ) in i's understanding of j's perspective, normalized by the level of j's expertise. The trade-off is between advisors who are well-informed and those who are well-understood.
Since i seeks to observe the most informative opinion, she chooses to observe an individual for whom the variance γ is lowest. Ties arise with zero probability but for completeness we assume that they are broken in favor of the individual with the lowest label. That is,
Note that j it and hence L t have two determinants: the current expertise levels π jt and the precision v t ij of individuals' beliefs regarding the perspectives of others. The first determinant π jt is exogenously given and stochastically independent across individuals and times. In contrast, the second component v t ij is endogenous and depends on the sequence of prior advisor choices (L 1 , . . . , L t−1 ), which in turn depends on previously realizes levels of expertise.
Evolution of Beliefs
We now describe the manner in which the beliefs v t ij are revised over time. In particular we show that the belief of an observer about the perspective of her target becomes more precise once the opinion of the latter has been observed, and that the strength of this effect depends systematically on the realized expertise levels of both observer and observed.
Suppose that j it = j, so i observes y jt . Recall that j has previously observed x jt and updated her belief about the period t state in accordance with (1) (2) . Hence observation of y jt by i provides the following signal about µ j :
The variance of the noise in this signal is
and the precision of the signal is accordingly δ(π it , π jt ), defined as
Hence, using the formula in footnote 2, we obtain
where we are using the fact that if j it = j, then i receives no signal of j's perspective, and so her belief about µ j remains unchanged. This leads to the following closed-form solution:
Remark 3. This derivation assumes that individuals do not learn from the adviser choices of others, as described in L t . If fact, under our assumptions, there is no additional information contained in these choices because i can compute L t using publicly available data even before L t has been observed. 3 This simplifies the analysis dramatically, and is due to the linear formula in Footnote 2 for normal variables. In a more general model, i may be able to obtain useful information by observing L. For example, without linearity, v t+1 kj − v t kj could depend on y jt for some k with j kt = j.
Since y jt provides information about µ j , and v t+1 kj affects j kt for t ≥ t + 1, one could then infer useful information about µ j from j kt for such t . The formula (8) would not be true for t in that case, possibly allowing for other forms of inference at later dates.
Remark 4. By the argument in the previous remark, assumptions about the observability of the information network L are irrelevant for our analysis. However, assumptions about the observability of the state θ t and the actionsθ kt of others (including the actions of one's advisor, which incorporate information from her own advisor) are clearly relevant.
Each time i observes j, her beliefs about j's perspective become more precise. But, by (7), the increase δ (π it , π jt ) in precision depends on the specific realizations of π it and π jt in the period of observation, in accordance with the following. Observation 1. δ (π it , π jt ) is strictly increasing π it and strictly decreasing π jt . Hence,
In particular, if i happens to observe j during a period in which j is very precisely informed about the state, then i learns very little about j's perspective. This is because j's opinion largely reflects the signal and is therefore relatively uninformative about j's prior. If i is very well informed when observing j, the opposite effect arises and i learns a great deal about j's perspective. Having good information about the state also means that i has good information about j's signal, and is therefore better able to infer j's perspective based on the observed opinion. Finally, there is a positive lower bound δ on the amount of increase in precision, making beliefs about observed individuals more and more precise as time passes.
Given the precisions v t ij at the start of period t, and the realizations of the levels of expertise π it , the links chosen by each individual in period t are given by (6) . This then determines the precisions v t+1 ij at the start of the subsequent period in accordance with (8) , with initial precisions given by (4) . For completeness, we set v t ii = 0 for all individuals i and all periods t. This defines a Markov process, where the sample space is the set of nonnegative n × n matrices and the period t realization is
For any period t, let h t := {v 1 ij , ..., v t ij } denote the history of beliefs (regarding perspectives) upto the start of period t. Any such history induces a probability distribution over networks, with the period t network being determined by the realized values of π it . It also induces a distribution over the next period beliefs v t+1 ij . It is the long run properties of this sequence of networks and beliefs that we wish to characterize.
Network Dynamics
Recall from (6) that at any given date t, each individual i chooses an advisor j it with the goal of minimizing the perceived variance γ(π jt , v t ij ). At the start of this process, since the precisions v 1 ij are all equal, the expertise levels π jt are the only determinants of this choice. Hence the criterion (6) reduces to
That is, the best informed individual in the initial period is linked to by all others, and herself links to the second-best informed. occurs for expertise realizations between the shaded region and the 45-degree line. 4 In this region, while 2 is better informed than 1 (π 2t > π 1t ), the difference between their expertise levels is not large enough to overcome the stronger attachment of individuals 3 and 4 to their common past adviser (v 2 i1 > v 2 i2 for i ∈ {3, 4}). Below the shaded region, the difference in expertise levels between 1 and 2 is large enough to induce both individuals 3 and 4 to switch to the best informed target in the second period (j 32 = j 42 = 2).
Within the shaded region, however, symmetry is broken and individuals 3 and 4 choose different 4 The figure has variances of ε1 and ε2 on the horizontal and vertical axes respectively, and is based on the specification v0 = 1, v31 = 2, and v41 = 4. Since 2 is assumed to be better informed than 1 in period 2, all expertise realizations must lie below the 45-degree line. advisor (j 4t = 1). In this region, the difference between the expertise levels of 1 and 2 is large enough to overcome the preference of 3 towards 1, but not large enough to overcome the stronger preference of individual 4, who was more precisely informed of the state in the initial period, and hence learned more about the perspective of her advisor. is now the best informed, but node 4 continues to observe node 1. This is because the perspective of 1 is better known to 4 than to 3, since 4 was better informed than 3 about the state in the initial period.
This example illustrates the trade-off between being well informed and being well understood.
It is clear that this can prevent the formation of networks in which all individuals link to the best informed, and can give rise to history dependence. One of the key questions of interest in this paper is whether this is a temporary effect, or whether it can arise even in the long run.
In order to explore this question, we introduce some notation. We say that the link ij is active in period t if l t ij = 1. Given any history h t , we say that the link ij is broken in period t if, conditional on this history, the probability of the link being active in period t is zero. That is, the link ij is broken in period t conditional on history h t if
If a link is broken in period t we write b t ij = 1. It is easily verified that if a link is broken in period t then it is broken in all subsequent periods. 5 Finally, we say that a link ij is free in period t conditional on history h t if the probability that it will be broken in this or any subsequent period is zero. That is, link ij is free in period t if
for all non-negative integers s. If a link is free at time t, there is a positive probability that it will be active in the current period as well as in each subsequent period. A particular realization of this process for three individuals over the first six periods is shown in Figure 3 . As before, nodes are numbered in increasing order anti-clockwise starting from the top, solid lines indicate links in both directions, and dashed lines indicate a link in one direction.
Node 2 is the best informed in the initial period, while node 1 is the second best informed. Hence 2 links to 1 and the others link to 2. No links are broken, but links in both directions between 1 and 2 become free, as does the link from 3 to 2. The pattern of active links is is repeated in the second period, even though 2 need not be the best informed at this date. In the third period 1 switches to 3, who is now better informed than 2. The link from 3 to 1 is broken in the fourth period, and the link from 2 to 3 in the fifth. At this point the network is fully resolved (all links are either broken or free), and there are only two possibilities remaining feasible. In particular, links 21 and 32 are always active after this point, while 12 and 13 are sometimes active.
We next identify conditions under which a link breaks or becomes free. Define
, and note that this threshold precision satisfies the indifference condition
between a minimally informed individual whose perspective is known and a maximally informed individual whose perspective is uncertain with precision v. Define also the function β : (0, v) → R + , by setting
This function satisfies the indifference condition
between a maximally informed individual whose perspective is uncertain with precision v and a minimally informed individual whose perspective is uncertain with precision β (v).
In our analysis, we shall ignore histories that result in ties and arise with zero probability.
Accordingly, define
We shall consider only histories h t ∈ H.
Our first result characterizes histories after which a link is broken.
Lemma 1. For any history h t ∈ H, a link ij is broken at h t if and only if
, individual i never links to j because the cost γ π kt , v t ik of linking to k is always lower than the cost γ π jt , v t ij of linking to j. Since v t ij remains constant and v t ik cannot decrease, i never links to j thereafter, i.e., the link ij is broken. Conversely, if the inequality is reversed, i links to j when j is sufficiently well-informed and all others are sufficiently poorly informed.
The next result characterizes histories after which a link becomes free.
Lemma 2. A link ij is free after history h t ∈ H if and only if
) for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}, all links ik are broken by Lemma 1, and hence i links to j in all subsequent periods, and ij is therefore free. Moreover, when v ij > v, i links to j with positive probability in each period, and each such link causes v ij to increase further.
Hence the probability that i links to j remains positive perpetually, so ij is free. Conversely, in all remaining cases, there is a positive probability that i will link to some other node k repeatedly until v ik exceeds β(v t ij (h t )), resulting in the link ij being broken. (By Observation 1, this happens when i links to k at least (β(v t ij (h t )) − v t ik (h t ))/δ times.) Note that the above lemmas imply that along every infinite history, every link eventually either breaks or becomes free. Here one or both of the two links remains to be resolved. If v < v 32 < β(v 31 ), then although the link 32 is free, the link 31 has not been resolved. Depending on subsequent expertise realizations, either both links will become free or 31 will break. Symmetrically, when v < v 31 < β(v 32 ), the link 31 is free while the other link will either break or become free in some future period. Since the initial precisions of beliefs about perspectives lie on the 45 degree line by assumption, the size of this common precision v 0 determines whether history independence is ensured, is possible but not ensured, or is not possible. 6 In the first of these cases, individuals almost always link to the best informed person in the long run, and the history of realizations eventually ceases to matter.
In the second case, this outcome is possible but not guaranteed: there is a positive probability that some links will be broken. And in the third case, history matters perpetually and initial realizations have permanent effects. We now identify the conditions under which each of these three regimes arises and describe some of the possible structures that can emerge.
Long-run Frequency of Networks
In this section, we characterize the long-run frequency of each communication network that can emerge in our model. This allows us to provide a simple expression for long-run payoffs and long-run efficiency.
Let G denote the set of functions g : N → N that satisfy g(i) = i for each i ∈ N . Each element of G thus corresponds to a directed graph in which each node is linked to one target. This is the set of all feasible networks that can arise. Our main goal in this section is to find the frequency with which each g ∈ G is realized in the long run. To this end, for each infinite history h, each t, and each g, define
We call this the long-run frequency of graph g at history h.
The long-run frequencies are determined by the free links. Towards establishing this, for any mapping J : N → 2 N with i ∈ J (i) and J(i) nonempty for each i, define
at each g ∈ G. Note that p J (g) = 0 if g(i) / ∈ J(i) for some i. If each individual i were restricted to choose the most informed individual in J(i) as the advisor, each graph g would be realized with probability p J (g).
Finally, for each infinite history h, define the mapping
Here J h (i) is the (nonempty) set of individuals to whom i links to infinitely many times along the history h. On this path, eventually, the links ij with j ∈ J h (i) become free, and all other links break. The following result states that, in the long run, each individual i links to the most informed target in J h (i).
Proposition 1. Almost surely, the long-run frequency φ ∞ (·|h) exists, and More generally, Proposition 1 implies that each individual i eventually uses each of his long-run advisers J h (i) with equal frequency. Let
denote the frequency with which i links to j over the first t periods of history h. Then we have
In the long run, each individual i observes the most informed member of J h (i) in any given period. Using this fact, one can show that his expected payoff at the start of of each period t converges to when a single graph g repeats itself forever in the long run; we call such a graph g stable.
We next provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition under which long-run efficiency obtains at all histories. We then show that, when the the condition fails, many interesting communication structures such as information segregation and opinion leadership emerge with positive probability in the long run. In particular, the least efficient long run-behavior also arises with positive probability, and any arbitrary g ∈ G can emerge as the stable graph.
7 Note that Proposition 1 does not require that the expertise realizations π1, ..., πn be independently and identically distributed. Even with asymmetric distributions of expertise, one can obtain sharp predictions regarding the long run network structure. For instance, along histories where all individuals link to all others infinitely often, a graph g has positive long-run frequency if and only if g = gi 1 i 2 for some distinct i1, i2 ∈ N , although all such graphs need not arise with equal frequency.
History Independence
In this section, we characterize the conditions under which the long-run behavior is necessarily efficient and (equivalently) history independent. Long-run efficiency is characterized by J h (i) = N \ {i} for every i with probability 1. A more direct definition is as follows. When the process of network formation is history independent in the long run, each individual will eventually observe the best informed individual with high probability. Specifically, this probability can be made arbitrarily close to 1 if a sufficiently large number of realizations is considered: Definition 1. For any given history h t , the process {V t } ∞ t=1 is said to be history independent at h t if, for all ε > 0, there exists t * > t such that
for all t > t * and i ∈ N . The process {V t } ∞ t=1 is said to be history independent if it is history independent at the initial history h 1 .
This definition is equivalent to the above characterization. Clearly the process cannot be history independent in this sense if there is a positive probability that one or more links will be broken at any point in time. Moreover, history independence is obtained whenever all links become free and have uniform positive bound on probability of occurence throughout. Building on this fact and Lemma 2, the next result provides a simple characterization for history independence.
Proposition 2. For any h t ∈ H, the process {V t } ∞ t=1 is history independent at h t if and only if v t ij (h t ) > v for all distinct i, j ∈ N . In particular, the process {V t } ∞ t=1 is history independent if and only if v 0 > v. Depending on the extreme values a and b of possible expertise levels, the threshold v can take any value. When expertise is highly variable in absolute or relative terms (i.e. b − a or b/a are large), v is small, leading to history independence for a broad range of v 0 values. Conversely, when expertise is not sufficiently variable in the same sense, the threshold v becomes large, and history independence is more likely to fail. This makes intuitive sense, since it matters less to whom one links under these conditions, and hysteresis is therefore less costly in informational terms.
The logic of the argument is as follows. When v 0 ij = v 0 > v, there is a positive lower bound on the probability that a i links to j at the outset, regardless of her beliefs about others. Since v t ij is nondecreasing in t, this lower bound is valid at all dates and histories, so i links to j infinitely often with probability 1. But every time i links to j, v t ij increases by at least δ. Hence, after a finite number of periods, i knows the perspective of j with arbitrarily high precision. This of course applies to all other individuals, so i comes to know all perspectives very well, and chooses advisors largely on the basis of their expertise level. Conversely, when v 0 ij = v 0 < v, it is possible that i ends up linking to another individual j sufficiently many times, learning his perspective with such high precision that the link ij breaks. After this point, i no longer observes j no matter how well informed the latter may be.
Proposition 2 identifies a necessary and sufficient condition for history independence at the initial history. If this condition fails to hold, then the process {V t } ∞ t=1 exhibits hysteresis: there exists a date t by which at least one link is broken with positive probability. History independence (at the initial history) and hysteresis are complements because in our model any link either becomes free or breaks along every path, and history independence is equivalent to all links becoming eventually free with probability 1. Proposition 2 therefore can be restated as follows:
exhibits hysteresis if and only if v 0 < v.
When history independence fails, a number of interesting network structures can arise. We now consider three of these: opinion leadership, informational segregation, and static communication networks.
Network Structures

Opinion Leadership
One network structure that can arise is opinion leadership, with some subset of individuals being observed with high frequency even when their levels of expertise are known to be low, while others are never observed regardless of their levels of expertise. This can happen because repeated observation of a leader allows her perspective to become well understood by others, and hence her opinion can be more easily interpreted even when her information is poor.
We say that a sample path exhibits opinion leadership if there is some period t and some nonempty subset S ⊂ N such that b ij = 1 for all (i, j) ∈ N × S. That is, opinion leadership exists if some individuals are never observed (regardless of expertise realizations) after time t along the sample path in question.
An special case of opinion leadership arises when n links are free while the rest are all broken.
In this case, all individuals are locked into a particular target, regardless of expertise realizations.
In an extreme case, there may be a single leader to whom all others link, and a second individual to whom the leader alone links in all periods. We refer to this property of sample paths as extreme opinion leadership.
Define the cutoffṽ ∈ (0, v) as the unique solution to the equation
The following result establishes that unless we have history independence (in which case hysteresis is impossible) there is a positive probability of extreme opinion leadership, and such extreme leadership is inevitable when v 0 is sufficiently small:
exhibits extreme opinion leadership (i) with positive probability if and only if v 0 < v, and (ii) with probability 1 if and only if v 0 <ṽ.
The intuition for this result is straightforward: any network that is realized in period t has a positive probability of being realized again in period t + 1 because the only links that can possibly break at t are those that are inactive in this period. Hence there is a positive probability that the network that forms initially will also be formed in each of the first s periods for any finite s. More generally, two or more information leaders may emerge, who might themselves have different sets of targets. An example is shown in Figure 5 , where nodes 1 and 4 emerge as leaders, and themselves link to 5 and 3 respectively. By the sixth period all links that target a member of the set {2, 6} are broken, and these two individuals are never subsequently observed. Furthermore, the two information leaders are each locked in to a single target, while the remaining individuals observe both information leaders with positive probability in all periods.
Information Segregation
Despite the ex ante symmetry of the model, it is possible for clusters to emerge in which individuals within a cluster link only to others within the same cluster in the long run. In this case there may even be a limited form of history independence within clusters, so that individuals tend to link to the best informed in their own group, but avoid linkages that cross group boundaries.
We say that a sample path exhibits segregation over a partition {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m } of N if there is a period t such that b t ij = 1 for all (i, j) ∈ S k × S l with k = l. That is, segregation over a partition The first few periods of a sample path that exhibits segregation is illustrated in Figure 6 . In this case the disjoint clusters {1, 2, 3} and {4, 5, 6} emerge with positive probability. Although this network is not resolved by the end of the last period depicted, it is easily seen that there as a positive probability of segregation after this history since no link that connects individuals in two different clusters is free.
In order for a segregation to arise over a partition {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m }, each S k must have at least two elements. Excluding the trivial partition {N }, write P for the set of all partitions The forces that give rise to segregation can be understood by reconsidering the example depicted in Figure 6 , where two segregated clusters of equal size emerge in a population of size 6. Nodes 1, 2 and 3 are the best informed, respectively, in the first three periods. After period 4, all links from this cluster to the nodes 4-6 are broken. Following this nodes 4-6 are best informed and link to each other, but receive no incoming links. Although the network is not yet resolved by the ends of the sixth period, it is clear that segregation can arise with positive probability because any finite repetition of the period 6 network has positive probability, and all links across the two clusters must break after a finite number of such repetitions. Hence a very particular pattern of expertise realizations is required to generate segregation, but any partition of the population into segregated clusters can arise with positive probability. This indeterminacy of network structures extends further. We shown next that each individual may be locked into a single, arbitrarily given target in the long run. This implies that every worst case scenario (with respect to information aggregation) can arise with positive probability.
Static Networks
Let G denote the set of functions g : N → N that satisfy g(i) = i. Each element of G thus corresponds to a directed graph in which each node is linked to one (not necessarily unique) target.
We say that a sample path converges to g ∈ G if there exists a period t * such that, for all i ∈ N and all t > t * , j it = g(i). The process {V t } ∞ t=1 converges to g with positive probability if the probability that a sample path will converge to g is positive. In this case there is a positive probability that each individual eventually links only to the target prescribed for her by g.
In order to identify the range of parameter values for which any given network g ∈ G can emerge with positive probability as an outcome of the process, we make the following assumption.
Note that this assumption is satisfied whenever v 0 > v * where v * is defined by
In addition to Assumption 1, convergence to an arbitrary network g ∈ G requires that v 0 be sufficiently small:
and satisfies Assumption 1. Then, for any graph g ∈ G, the process {V t } ∞ t=1 converges to g with positive probability. While the emergence of opinion leadership is intuitive, the possibility of convergence to an arbitrary graph is much less so. Since all observers face the same distribution of expertise in the population, and almost all link to the same target in the initial period, the possibility that they may all choose different targets in the long run is counter-intuitive. Nevertheless, there exist sequences of expertise realizations that result in such strong asymmetries.
Strong Hysteresis
The three classes of networks discussed in the previous section are not by any means exhaustive, and a variety of other outcomes are possible when the condition for history independence does not hold at the initial history. Recall that the process {V t } ∞ t=1 exhibits hysteresis if there exists a date t by which at least one link is broken with positive probability. Note that this is consistent with the possibility that all links become free with positive probability. Hysteresis rules out history independence at the initial history, but allows for history independence to arise after some histories with positive probability.
We now introduce a stronger notion of hysteresis, which rules out the possibility that all links will eventually be free. For any given history h t , the process {V t } ∞ t=1 is said to exhibit strong hysteresis at h t if the probability that no links will break in period t + 1 is zero. It is said to exhibit strong hysteresis if it exhibits strong hysteresis at the initial history h 0 .
An immediate implication of Proposition 3 is that the process exhibits strong hysteresis if v 0 <ṽ, since this is sufficient for opinion leadership to arise with probability 1. In this case each individual links perpetually to the first person they observe. However, v 0 <ṽ is not necessary for strong hysteresis. To see why, consider the three agent example described in Section 3. will eventually be free. But this does not mean that there is a positive probability that all links in the network will be free: sample paths that result in both 31 and 32 being free might require that some other link be broken. This is in fact the case.
We next identify a necessary and sufficient condition for strong hysteresis. To this end, definê v as the unique solution to
We then have:
Proposition 6. For any h 1 ∈ H, the process {V t } ∞ t=1 exhibits strong hysteresis if and only if v 0 <v.
It is easily verified thatv >ṽ, as expected. The condition v 0 <ṽ is necessary and sufficient for all links to break in the initial period except for the ones that are active, resulting in opinion leadership. The weaker condition v 0 <v is necessary and sufficient for at least one link to break.
This rules out history independence at any future period, but allows for a broad range of network structures to emerge in the long run, including segregation and static networks.
Related Literature
A key idea underlying our work is that there is some aspect of cognition that is variable across individuals, stable over time, and affects the manner in which information pertaining to a broad range of issues is filtered. Differences in political ideology or cultural orientation can give rise to such stable variability in the manner in which information is interpreted. This is a feature of the cultural theory of perception (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) and the related notion of identity-protective cognition (Kahan et al., 2007) .
A striking example of stable variability in perspectives may be found in perceptions of changes in local weather patterns. Goebbert et al. (2012) surveyed a large sample of respondents across a variety of locations, and collected information on perceived changes in local temperatures and precipitation, together with geographic and demographic information, self-declared political ideology (strong liberal to strong conservative on a seven point scale), and answers to questions that allowed for a three-way classification of respondents by worldview (egalitarian, hierarchist and individualist). They found that politically conservative and individualist respondents were significantly less likely to have perceived recent increases in local temperatures relative to their more liberal and egalitarian counterparts. Since all respondents at a given location were exposed to precisely the same local temperatures, such differences in perception cannot plausibly be attributed solely to differences in information. 
Conclusions
Interpreting the opinions of others is challenging because such opinions are based in part on private information and in part on prior beliefs that are not directly observable. Individuals seeking informative opinions may therefore choose to observe those whose priors are well-understood, even if their private information is noisy. This problem is compounded by the fact that observing opinions is informative not only about private signals but also about prior perspectives, so preferential attachment to particular persons can develop endogenously over time. And since the extent of such attachment depends on the degree to which the observer is well-informed, there is a natural process of symmetry breaking. This allows for a broad range of networks to emerge over time, including opinion leadership and informations segregation.
Our analysis has been based on a number of simplifying assumptions. We have assumed that just one target can be observed in each period rather than several, and this could be relaxed by allowing for costs of observation that increase with the number of targets selected. Observation of the actions of others, and observation of the state itself could also be informative and affect beliefs about perspectives. It would also be worth relaxing the assumption of myopic choice, which would allow for some experimentation. We suspect that perfectly patient players will choose targets in a manner that implies history independence, but that our qualitative results will survive as long as players are sufficiently impatient. But these and other extensions are left for future research.
where the inequality is by monomotonicity of γ and the equality is by definition of β. Hence, Pr l t ij = 1|h t = 0. Moreover, by (9) , at any h t+1 that follows
, and hence the previous argument yields Pr l t+1 ij = 1|h t = 0. Inductive application of the same argument shows that Pr l s ij = 1|h t = 0 for every s ≥ 0, showing that the link ij is broken at h t . Conversely, suppose that v t ik (h t ) < β v t ij (h t ) for every k ∈ N \ {i, j}. Then, by definition of β, for all k / ∈ {i, j},
where the inequality is by γ being decreasing in v. Hence, by continuity of γ, there exists η > 0 such that for all k / ∈ {i, j},
Consider the event π jt ∈ [b − η, b] and π kt ∈ [a, a + η] for all k = j. This has positive probability, and on this event l t ij = 1, showing that link ij is not broken at h t .
Proof of Lemma 2. To prove sufficiency, first take any i, j with v t ij (h t ) > v. Then, by definition of v, for any k / ∈ {i, j},
where the first inequality is because γ is decreasing in v and the second inequality is by definition of v. Hence, by continuity of γ, there exists η > 0 such that for all k / ∈ {i, j},
Consider the event π jt ∈ [b−η, b] and π kt ∈ [a, a+η] for all k = j. This has positive probability, and on this event l t ij = 1. Hence Pr(b t ij = 1) = 0. For any s ≥ t, since v s ij ≥ v t ij ≥ v, we have Pr(l s ij = 1) > 0, showing that the link ij is free. On the other hand, if v t ij (h t ) ≥ max k∈N \{i,j} β v t ik (h t ) , then, by Lemma 1, all the links ik with k ∈ N \ {i, j} are broken at h t , and hence i links to j with probability one thereafter. Therefore, the link ij is free. This proves sufficiency.
For the converse, take v t ij (h t ) < min v, max k∈N \{i,j} β v t ik (h t ) . We will show that the link ij will break with positive probability by some t * > t.
, by Lemma 1, the link ij is broken at h t , as desired. Assume that v t ik (h t ) < β v t ij (h t ) . By continuity of γ, there exists η > 0 such that γ π kt , v t ik (h t ) > γ π k t , v t ik (h t ) on the positive probability event that π kt ∈ [b − η, b] and π k t ∈ [a, a + η] for all k = k. In that case, i links to k, increasing v t ik and keeping v t ik as is. Hence, i keeps linking to k on the positive probability event that π ks ∈ [b − η, b] and π k s ∈ [a, a + η] for all k = k and s ∈ {t, t + 1, . . . , t * } where t * = t + β v t ij (h t ) − v t ik (h t ) /δ . 10 Then, on that event, by (9) ,
where the inequality is by Observation 1. Therefore, the link ij breaks by t * on this event.
Long-Run Frequency of Networks
In this subsection, we prove Proposition 1. The following definitions and notation will be useful.
denote the set of expertise realizations such that each pair of expertise levels are within λ of each other. For any given J, let
denote the conditional probability distribution on g obtained by restricting expertise realizations to lie outside the set D λ , and p J is as defined in (10) . Finally, for any probability distribution distribution p on G, let
denote the set of probability distributions q on G such that q(g) and p(g) are within ε of each other for all g ∈ G.
We say that φ t (· | h) ∈ B ε (p) eventually if there exists t such that φ t (· | h) ∈ B ε (p) for all t > t.
The following basic observations will also be useful in our proof.
Observation 2. The following are true.
1. For every ε > 0, there exists λ > 0 such that Pr D λ < ε.
2. For every λ > 0, there exists v λ < ∞ such that if v t ij > v λ and π jt > π j t + λ, then j it = j .
The first of these observations follows from the fact that Pr(D λ ) is continuous and approaches 0 as λ → 0, and the second can be readily deduced using (5) . The following lemma is the main step in our proof.
Lemma 3. Let λ ∈ (0, 1), t 0 , J, and h t 0 be such that
where v λ is as in Observation 2. Then, for any ε > Pr D λ ,
Proof. For each g ∈ G and each continuation history h of h t 0 , φ t (g | h) can be decomposed as
Here, the last equality is by the hypothesis in the lemma and by the definition of v λ in Observation 2. Hence, by the strong law of large numbers, as t → ∞,
Thus, almost surely,
where the inequality follows from the fact that lim sup t φ t,1 (g | h) ≤ Pr(D λ ), which in turn follows from the strong law of large numbers and the definition of φ t,1 . Likewise, almost surely,
where the inequality follows from lim inf t φ t,1 (g | h) ≥ 0 and p J,λ (g) ≤ 1. Hence for any ε > Pr(D λ ),
for almost all continuations h of h t 0 , there exists t such that
for all g. That is, φ t (·|h) ∈ B ε (p J,λ ) eventually, almost surely.
Proof of Proposition 1. For every h ∈ H and ε > 0, there exist λ > 0 and h t 0 such that Pr(D λ ) < ε,
and the hypothesis of Lemma 3 holds for J = J h . Hence,
we conclude from Lemma 3 via the law of iterated expectations that Pr (H ε ) = 1.
Clearly, H ε is decreasing in ε, and as ε → 0,
Therefore,
Pr (H ε ) = 1.
History Independence
Proof of Proposition 2. First take
then all the links ik with k = j are broken at h t . Otherwise, as shown in the proof of Lemma 2, the link ij is broken with positive probability by some t * > t. In either case, Pr (j is ∈ arg max k π ks |h t ) is bounded away from 1, showing that V t ∞ t=1
is not history independent at h t .
Assume now v t ij (h t ) > v for all distinct i, j ∈ N . Of course, v s ij (h s ) ≥ v t ij (h t ) > v for all distinct i, j ∈ N and for every history after h t . Now, since γ (π, v) is continuous in π and 1/v and F is continuous over [a, b] , for every ε > 0, there existsṽ < ∞ such that Pr j is ∈ arg max j =i π js > 1−ε whenever v s ij >ṽ for all distinct i and j. Hence, it suffices to show that, conditional on h t , v s ij → ∞ as s → ∞ for all distinct i and j almost surely. To this end, observe that
where the first equality is because γ is decreasing in v t ij and the second inequality is by definition of v. Hence, by continuity of γ, there exists η > 0 such that γ b − η, v t ij (h t ) < γ (a + η, v) (∀v, i, j) . 
Network Structures
Proof of Proposition 3. Clearly, when v 0 > v, the long-run outcome is history independent by Proposition 2, and hence opinion leadership is not possible. Accordingly, suppose that v 0 < v.
Consider the positive probability event A that for every t ≤ t * , π 1t > π 2t > max k>2 π kt for some ( Here, the equalities are by (9) ; the weak inequality is by Observation 1, and the strict inequality is by definition of t * .) Therefore, by Lemma 1, all the links ik ∈ S are broken by t * , resulting in the extreme opinion leadership as desired.
To prove the second part, note that for any v 0 ≤ṽ and i ∈ N ,
while v 2 ik = v 0 for all k = j i1 , showing by Lemma 1 that all such links ik are broken after the first period. Since j i1 = min arg max i π i1 for every i = min arg max i π i1 , this shows that extreme leadership emerges at the end of first period with probability 1. The claim that extreme opinion leadership arises with probability less than 1 if v 0 >ṽ follows from Proposition 4, which is proved below.
Proof of Proposition 4. Take any v 0 ∈ (ṽ, v − δ) and any partition {S 1 , . . . , S m } where each cluster S k has at least two elements i k and j k . We will now construct a postive probability event on which the process exhibits segregation over partition {S 1 , . . . , S m }. Since v 0 ∈ (ṽ, v − δ), there exists a small ε > 0 such that v 0 + δ (a + ε, b − ε) < min {β (v 0 ) , v} (14) and δ (b − ε, b) > δ (a + ε, b − ε) .
By (15) and by continuity and monotonicity properties of γ, there also exist π * ∈ (a, b) and ε > 0 such that
γ π * + ε , v 0 + δ (a + ε, b − ε) > γ (b − ε, v 0 ) .
For every t ∈ {2, . . . , m}, the realized expertise levels are as follows:
π it < a + ε (∀i ∈ S k , k > t) .
Fixing t * > (β (v 0 + δ (a + ε, b − ε)) − v 0 ) /δ, the realized expertise levels for t ∈ {m + 1, . . . , m + t * } are as follows:
The above event has clearly positive probability. We will next show that the links ij from distinct clusters are all broken by m + t * + 1.
Note that at t = 1, j i 1 1 = j 1 and j i1 = i 1 for all i = i 1 . Hence,
where the strict inequality is by (15) .Therefore, by (16), at t = 2, each i ∈ S 1 sticks to his previous link j i 1 1 = j 1 and j i1 = i 1 ∀i ∈ S 1 \ {i 1 } , while each i ∈ S 1 switches to a new link j i 2 2 = j 2 and j i2 = i 2 ∀i ∈ N \ (S 1 ∪ {i 2 }) .
Using the same argument inductively, observe that for any t ∈ {2, . . . , m}, for any i ∈ S k and i ∈ S l with k < t ≤ l, and for any s < t, In particular, at t = m, for any i ∈ S k , j im = i k if i = i k and j i k m = j k . Once again,
Moreover, i could have observed any other j at most once, when π it < a * + ε and π jt > b − ε,
Hence, by (16) , i sticks to j im by date m + t * , yielding
for each j = j im . By Lemma 1, this shows that the link ij is broken. Since j im ∈ S k , this proves the result.
Proof of Proposition 5. Take v 0 as in the hypothesis, and take any g : N → N . We will construct some t * and a postive probability event on which j it = g (i) ∀i ∈ N, t > n + t * .
Now, let π be as in Assumption 1. By continuity of δ and γ, there exists a small but positive ε such that
γ (b − ε, v 0 ) < γ (π + ε, v 0 + δ (π + ε, b − ε))
δ (b − ε, π + ε) > δ (π + ε, b − ε) .
Fix some t * > (β (v 0 + δ (π + ε, b − ε)) − v 0 ) /δ, and consider the following positive probability event:
π tt ≥ b − ε > π + ε ≥ π g(t)t ≥ π > a + ε ≥ π jt (∀j ∈ N \ {t, g (t)} , ∀t ∈ N ) , (π 1t , . . . .π nt ) ∈ A (∀t ∈ {n + 1, . . . , n + t * })
where A ≡ {(π 1 , . . . , π n ) |γ (π i , v 0 + δ (π + ε, b − ε)) > γ (π j , v 0 + δ (b − ε, π + ε)) ∀i, j ∈ N } .
Note that
A is open and non-empty (as it contains the diagonal set). Note that at every date
